Operation Angelo investigated a former Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) employee who accessed and made unauthorised disclosures of Home Affairs records and official information for family, friends, associates and tenants, over an extended period.
This was a joint investigation commenced by the former Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) and Home Affairs. The National Anti-Corruption Commission became responsible for the investigation from 1 July 2023.
This case study uses pseudonyms.
Financial benefit and personal interests
This case involved a Commonwealth public official using their official role to access and disclose official information to benefit themselves and others, constituting an abuse of office and misuse of information.
The investigation uncovered a long-term pattern of unethical behaviour by the public official throughout their lengthy career in Home Affairs across various roles. The public official accessed a significant amount of personal information for the benefit of their interests, including family, friends and associates.
In accessing departmental information they didn’t need to in their job, and in making unauthorised disclosures of information to third parties, the public official was misusing information.
A public official engages in corrupt conduct if they abuse their office or misuse information or documents.
Referral
An internal Home Affairs Active Detection Program, established to identify instances of potential unauthorised systems accesses, was able to retrieve audit results going back to 2014. It detected multiple instances of unauthorised access to client records.
Home Affairs made a formal notification to ACLEI in May 2021 under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (no longer in force). The term ‘formal notification’ is now known as a mandatory referral under the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022.
This case highlights the value of agencies implementing programs to monitor access to ICT systems to assist in the prevention and detection of corrupt conduct.
What happened
Sandra was an APS5 staff member working in a team within Home Affairs that provided client services to persons living in Australia and awaiting settlement and the resolution of their immigration status.
Sandra also owned a rental property business with a significant investment property portfolio, and many of her tenants were temporary residents or persons progressing through the visa application process.
During the investigation, which commenced in November 2021, ACLEI investigators executed a search warrant at Sandra’s home and seized various items.
The investigation obtained evidence of repeated instances of unauthorised access by Sandra between December 2010 and January 2022. She had accessed and disclosed departmental records to:
- provide her friends with personal details of individuals, which they later used to submit reports through the Border Watch Online Report
- obtain and verify the visa status and personal details of several former tenants
- provide advice and assistance to former tenants about their visa applications, including the process and progress of their application and, in some instances, its eventual approval
- warn her friends to stop their visa applications to avoid rejection, in one instance potentially saving them approximately $6,800
- aid her own application to the NSW Supreme Court to remove a solicitor from the probate process of her deceased friend
- avoid paying real estate agent property management commission/fees ordinarily associated with tenant background checks
Outcome
Home Affairs terminated Sandra’s employment in May 2023.
ACLEI referred a brief of evidence to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions who, in June 2023, commenced a prosecution.
In August 2024, Sandra pleaded guilty to a number of contraventions of the Criminal Code, including unauthorised access to restricted data, unauthorised disclosure of information and abuse of public office.
The magistrate described Sandra’s conduct as ‘egregious’, ‘dishonest’ and ‘quite a fall from grace’.
The magistrate imposed a sentence of 14 months imprisonment, to be released immediately on a recognisance to be of good behaviour for 2 years. On appeal in May 2025, the District Court reduced the sentence from 14 months to 12 months.
Corruption prevention commentary
Sandra had a lengthy career at Home Affairs working in various roles. This provided her with the opportunity, knowledge and ability to use departmental systems to obtain official information without authorisation.
Existing internal audits failed to capture and identify the unauthorised accesses by Sandra, which contributed to her pattern of corrupt behaviour continuing undetected over an extended period.
Implementation of the Active Detection Program by Home Affairs enabled the retrieval of audit results from 2014. This made it possible to identify Sandra’s unauthorised access of official information. This is an example of good practice in proactive detection and deterrence of corrupt conduct.
Proactive detection programs and audits of ICT access are an important measure to prevent and detect unauthorised access to and misuse of official information.
Further information
For further corruption prevention information, see Corruption prevention and education.
To report a corruption issue, see Report corrupt conduct.