Operation Roe investigated a former Australian Taxation Office (ATO) employee who accessed taxation records without authorisation.
This was a joint investigation commenced by the former Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) and the ATO. The National Anti-Corruption Commission became responsible for the investigation from 1 July 2023.
This case study uses pseudonyms.
Misuse of information
A public official can engage in corrupt conduct if they misuse information or documents that they have or had access to because of their role as a public official.
There is no need to show that a public official intended to gain a benefit or cause a detriment to another person through the misuse of the information.
This case involved a Commonwealth public official using their official role to access information on their agency’s IT system that they did not need to know to fulfill their official duties. In accessing departmental information, they didn’t need to in their job, the public official was misusing information.
Referral
The ATO Fraud Prevention and Internal Investigations team undertook a detection scan, revealing that an ATO employee had conducted a series of unauthorised accesses.
The ATO made a formal notification to ACLEI in May 2021 under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (no longer in force). The term ‘formal notification’ is now known as a mandatory referral under the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022.
This case highlights the value of agencies deploying internal investigations teams and implementing ongoing and effective internal scans to assist in the prevention and detection of corrupt conduct.
What happened
David was an APS4 staff member of the ATO who worked on compliance and prosecutions. In his role, David had access to ATO systems that contained comprehensive client records.
In late April 2021, internal ATO investigators conducted an initial routine system scan which detected unauthorised accesses made by David. A full audit revealed David had made an extensive number of unauthorised accesses.
Also in late April 2021, David resigned from the ATO. He left the agency in early May 2021 to work in the private sector.
The investigation found David had accessed significant amounts of sensitive and private information, without authority, relating to himself, his family members, friends, colleagues and a prospective employer in the private sector, and its employees.
In July 2022, investigators executed a search warrant and subsequently conducted a record of interview with David who indicated he made the unauthorised accesses out of curiosity.
The investigation obtained evidence that David knowingly and unlawfully accessed taxation records in the possession of the ATO Commissioner.
The investigation obtained no evidence that David had gained any benefit from the unauthorised accesses for himself, his family or associates.
Outcome
ACLEI investigators referred a brief of evidence to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
In early 2024, David pleaded guilty to a charge of unauthorised access of taxation records and was convicted - even though he had not gained any benefit from the unauthorised accesses for himself, his family or associates. It was enough that he knowingly and unlawfully accessed the information.
In sentencing remarks, the presiding judge considered the seriousness of the offending by David, stating that such actions were an invasion of taxpayer privacy and undermined public confidence in the ATO.
David was released, without passing sentence, on a recognisance in the sum of $2,000 to be of good behaviour for 18 months.
Corruption prevention commentary
Although David was only employed for a short time before the detection scan and his resignation, he engaged in significant unauthorised accesses, viewing the records of numerous ATO clients.
The work of the ATO internal investigation team identified David’s unauthorised accesses, resulting in the investigation and prosecution.
The Commission considers the detection scan conducted by ATO Fraud Prevention and the Internal Investigations team an example of good practice in proactive detection and deterrence of corrupt conduct.
Operation Roe demonstrates the risks and vulnerabilities relating to unauthorised access to official information by public officials, and the important role of internal monitoring and scanning in preventing and detecting unauthorised accesses.
Further information
For further corruption prevention information, see Corruption prevention and education.
To report a corruption issue, see Report corrupt conduct.